The guarantee of reasoned decisions in the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador as an essential foundation of due process: a case law analysis

Abstract

Due process, enshrined in Article 76 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, is recognized as a fundamental right that guarantees rational, fair, and reviewable judicial and administrative actions. Among its essential safeguards, the requirement of reasoned decisions stands out as a key mechanism to prevent arbitrariness, ensure transparency, and strengthen effective judicial protection. A properly reasoned decision must identify the applicable norms, justify their relevance in relation to the proven facts, and present clear reasoning that reveals the judge’s argumentative path. However, various studies have identified a persistent gap between the constitutional mandate and judicial practice, where decisions with merely apparent or insufficient reasoning continue to occur. In this context, Constitutional Court Judgment No. 379-17-EP/22 serves as a relevant reference for examining the scope of the reasoning requirement. The purpose of this article is to analyze how the Court conceptualizes and applies this requirement as a structural component of due process, reconstructing its doctrinal and normative foundations, reviewing the constitutional standards employed, and outlining the operational criteria projected toward the judiciary and constitutional litigation. The analysis shows that the Court reaffirms reasoning as a substantive element for the validity of judicial decisions and as a central parameter of constitutional review. It also demonstrates that the absence of adequate reasoning undermines effective judicial protection, enables the filing of the extraordinary action for protection, and obliges the issuance of new, properly reasoned decisions, thus ensuring the effectiveness of the constitutional state of rights and justice.